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1. SUMMARY: Petrs in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 contest 
the CA's finding that they discharged employees without providing 
a prior hearing required by the due process clause. Cross-petr 
in No. 83-6392 contends that he was deprived of liberty and prop-
erty interests without an adequate post-termination hearing. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp and cross-petr 
Loudermill worked as a security guard for petr and cross-resp Bd. 
of Educ. As a classified civil service employee, petr could be 
discharged only for cause, but the employment application filed 
by petr had provided that false statements on the application 
would be sufficient cause for dismissal. When petr discovered 
that resp had falsely stated on his employment application that 
he had never been convicted of a felony, petr advised resp that 





Cleveland Civil Service Comm'n, but was discharged the next day. 
Three months later, a Comm'n referee held a hearing on the case, 
and four months after that, the referee recommended that resp be 
reinstated. Three months thereafter, the Comm'n rejected the 
referee's recommendation. Petr then filed suit in DC, alleging 
that his dismissal without a pre-termination hearing and that the 
inordinate delay in his post-termination hearing violated his due 
process rights. He sought damages, declaratory relief, rein-
statement and backpay. The DC dismissed the complaint, holding 
that, although petr had a property interest in continued employ-
ment, due process did not require a pretermination hearing and 
that the post-termination hearing was sufficiently prompt to sat-
isfy due process standards. 
Resp Donnelly worked as a bus mechanic for the Parma Bd. 
of Educ. He also was a classified civil service employee. After 
resp twice failed an eye examination, he was discharged without 
further notice or hearing. He filed an appeal with the Civil 
Service Comm'n, that dismissed the appeal as untimely. Resp then 
sought a writ of mandamus in state court ordering the Comm'n to 
hear the case. Eventually, the parties agreed to issuance of the 
writ, and the Comm'n ordered resp reinstated. He then filed suit 
in state court, seeking damages and backpay on both state and 
federal grounds. The state court dismissed the case because resp 
had failed to seek an administrative appeal of the Comm'n deci-
sion. Resp then filed suit in federal DC, seeking damages for 
violation of his due process rights. The DC dismissed. 
. - -
On consolidated appeal, 
/ 
the CA reversed the DC. It 
first concluded that the resps need not exhaust state remedies, 
Patsy v. Bd. of Educ., 457 U.S. 496 (1982), and that the state 
court judgment against resp Donnelly was not res judicata as to 
his federal constitutional claims because it was not a judgment 
on the merits. The CA then held that resps had a property inter-
est in their jobs protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Apply-
ing the three factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976), the CA concluded that the compelling private interest in 
retaining government employment, and the usefulness of being able 
to present evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added ad-
ministrative burden that a pre-termination hearing would impose 
on the Board. The CA remanded to give resps a chance to prove 
that they had been damaged by the failure of the Board to provide 
a pre-termination hearing. The CA held, however, that there was 
no due process violation as a result of delay in resps' post-
termination hearings. The Ohio statute provided for hearings 
within a month of termination and authorized actions for mandamus 
to expedite delayed hearings. These protections were adequate to 
protect an employee's interest in a prompt post-termination hear-
ing. Nor were the liberty interests of resps violated by their 
discharge: as the reasons for discharge were not published, resps 
were not stigmatized by petr's actions. 
'Ihe ~ nt, citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 
(1974), contended that a post-deprivation hearing satisfied the 




3. CONTENTIONS: No. 83-1362: The plurality opinion in 
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), recognized that a post-
termination hearing may suffic~ satisfy the due process 
clause. The CA misapplied the Mathews v. Eldridge factors: the 
state has a strong interest in prompt termination of an employee 
who threatens the community's safety; the risk of error is mini-
mal because the case involved matters of public record; and an 
employee may be reinstated with backpay if a subsequent hearing 
shows that an error was made. Further,7 had no property 
right under the due process clause, ~Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 
341 (1976). 
The CA holding is in direct conflict with that of the 
Ohio S. Ct., Parfitt v. Columbus Correctional Facility, 416 
N.E.2d 521, that held no pre-termination hearing constitutionally 
required for termination of Civil Service employees. Other CAs 
have reached this result. Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 625 F.2d 462 
(CA5 1981); Cierchon v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 1055 (CA7 
1980). Finally, the case poses the same issue as Davis v. 
Scherer, No. 83-490. / 
Resp: In Krnett v. Kennedy, the government employee had 
received notice and an opportunity to comment on charges before 
his termination. The CA properly applied the Mathews v. Eldridge 
factors: even if there were a need for prompt action, resp could 
have been suspended rather than discharged. The CA cases cited 
by petr deal with suspension, not termination. 
No. 83-1363: Petr repeats the arguments made in No. 83-
1362. It notes as well that the disputed issue here involved a 
4- - .J -
- -
medical test, that Mathews had held to be sufficiently reliable 
so that any risk of erroneous deprivation did not justify a prior 
evidentiary hearing. 
No. 83-6392: The cross-petn contends that an administra-
tive proceeding may be unconstitutional because of excessive de-
lay. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1973). 
The interest in continued employment requires a prompt hearing. 
Further, cross-petr's liberty interests were infringed by termi-
nation of his job. Cross-petr was stigmatized because the rea-
sons for termination were communciated to prospective employers. 
Cross-resp: Resp's complaint was processed in nine 
months, an adequate period of time. Ohio provides a mechanism 
for prompt review. As to the liberty interest claim, cross-petr 
did not allege that the Bd. of Educ. had disseminated statements 
about petr. 
4. DISCUSSION: T7'CA decision accords with the line 
of cases, beginning with ~ rry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), 
that require some sort of hearing before the state fires an em-
ployee with tenure -- i.e., an employee who can be removed only 
"for cause." The CA cases relied upon by petr concern suspension 
rather than termination of employment. 
The case should not be held for Bd. of Educ. v. Vail, 
No. 83-87. ~ damages were awarded for breach of an em-
ployment cont~ hout prior hearing. Petr rested its argu-
ment on the fact that the employee, unlike the employees protect-
ed in past due process cases (or the resps here) did not enjoy 
tenure. And, although Vail might shed light on the evaluation 
, . - -
of damages in due process claims, the courts below did not reach 
the damages issue. 
The cross-petn also should be denied. While an exorbi-
tantly dilatory hearing may violate due process, a hearing within 
nine months of termination would seem to pass constitutional mus-
ter where a pre-termination hearing (or damages for failure to 
hold a pre-termination hearing) also is to be provided. The 
question is factbound in any event. Cross-petr apparently did 
not allege facts sufficient to establish violation of his liberty 
interest in avoiding stigmatization from loss of employment. 
IFP Status: Petr has submitted the appropriate affida-
vit. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION 
83-1362 V. 
JAMES LOUDERMILL ET AL. 5µ_)__ 
83-136 .? 
PARMA BOARD OF EDUCATION 
V. 
RICHARD DONNELLY ET AL. /~-
. />/y JAMES LOUDERMILL 
83-6392 V. 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 83-1362, 83-1363 & 83-6392. Decided May-, 1984 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
James Loudermill was employed as a security guard by the 
leveland Board of Education. He was classified as a civil 
se~e employee under Ohio law. Accordingly, he could be 
discharg-e4_ only for cause and was entitled to a hearing within 
thirty daysof--llis discharge. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34. 
When he appliectTo e job, Loudermill filled out an applica-
tion that required him to nd to the question, "Have you 
ever been convicted of a crime iv.-.,.,-..,,._, Loudermill re-
sponded, "No." At the end of the applicat10 , d a 
certification acknowledging that he was aware that "any false 
statements will be sufficient cause for dismissal from or re-
fusal of an appointment for any position with the Cleveland 
Board of Education." 
Approximately one year later, the Board discovered that 
Loudermill had been convicted of a felony in 1968. The 
Board sent Loudermill a letter, explaining that because of his 
dishonesty in filling out the application, he was being dis-











2 CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LOUDERMILL 
appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission but_ was 
discharged before the Commission could act. The Commis-
sion ultimately upheld the discharge, and Loudermill filed the 
present suit under 42 U. S. C. §°1983, alleging that the fail-
ure to afford him a pre-termination hearing violated his due 
process property rights. 1 
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, ruling that, while Loudermill had a 
constitutionally-protected property right in continued em-
ployment, due process did not require a pre-termination 
hearing. Shortly thereafter, the same court dismissed a 
similar complaint filed by Richard Donnelly, a bus mechanic 
who had been dismissed without a prior hearing by the 
Parma Board of Education after he twice failed to pass an eye 
examination. 2 
The two cases were consolidated on appeal, and the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the relevant portion 
of the District Court's orders. 3 The court rejected the con-
tention that, under Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974), 
the post-termination procedure outlined in § 124.34 ade-
quately protected the employees' constitutional rights, con-
cluding that Loudermill and Donnelly were entitled to pre-
1 Loudermill also alleged that the the Board's failure to afford him an 
opportunity to respond to the charges violated his due process right to lib-
erty and that the delay in completing his post-termination hearing violated 
his due process rights. He sought damages and a declaration that § 124.34 
was constitutionally invalid because it failed to provide civil service em-
ployees with an opportunity to respond to charges prior to removal. 
2 Donnelly also alleged that his equal protection rights had been violated 
because the Board continued to employ another mechanic who had failed 
the eye examination. Unlike Loudermill, Donnelly was eventually or-
dered reinstated by the Commission. 
3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of those 
parts of the complaints which alleged the violation of a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest . 
• 
• 
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CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LOUDERMILL 3 
termination hearings. The two Boards have sought review 
of that ruling. 
Ever since a divided Court decided Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U. S. 134 (1974) (five separate opinions were filed), lower 
courts have struggled to determine under what circum-
stances a pre-termination hearing is required before a public 
employer can constitutionally discharge one of its employees. 
See, e. g., Vanelli v. Reynolds School District No. 7, 667 F. 
2d 773, 778-779 (CA9 1982); Cierchon v. City of Chicago, 634 
F. 2d 1055, 1058-1060 (CA7 1980); Louise B. v. Coluatti, 606 
F. 2d 392, 401-402 (1979); Webb v. Dillon, 593 F. 2d 656; 
657-658 (CA5 1979); Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F. 2d 384, 
386-387 (1974). A review of those cases indicates that not all 
low~r courts have interpreted our rulings in -the same man-
ner. The confusion resulting from these divergent interpre-
tations is clearly apparent in this case. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the post-termination procedure provided by 
§ 124.34 was not constitutionally sufficient to protect the 
property interest that Ohio civil servants have in their con-
tinued employment and that, accordingly, a pre-termination 
hearing was required. Earlier, however, Chief Justice Cele-
brezze, writing for himself and the other members of the 
Ohio Supreme Court, rejected that very argument in a differ-
ent case challenging the validity of the Ohio law, stating, "[i]n 
Arnett v. Kennedy ... the United States Supreme Court 
made it clear that a pretermination hearing was not required 
under the Due Process Clause to remove federal civil service 
employees. In that case the court approved of a procedure 
essentially the equivalent of the one provided to classified 
employees in R. C. Chapter 124." Parfitt v. Columbus Cor-
rectional Facility, 406 N. E. 2d 528, 531 (Ohio 1980). 4 The 
existence of such a direct conflict evidences the uncertainty 
that exists in this area of the law. We should not only re-
• The Court of Appeals in this case recognized that its ruling was not 







4 CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LOUDERMILL 
solve the conflict between the highest court of Ohio and the 
Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which Ohio is located with 
respect to the constitutionality of the Ohio procedure, but 
also provide greater clarification of the appropriate standards 
to be applied in the numerous cases arising in other states as 
well. I would grant these petitions, 5 consolidate them, and 
set the cases for oral argument. 
5 Loudermill has filed a cross-petition, No. 83-6392, asking us to review 
the Court of Appeal's dismissal of his claims that the post-termination pro-
ceeding was insufficient because it was not completed until nine months 
after his discharge and that the Board violated his constitutionally-
protected liberty interests. I would also grant this petition so that the en-
tire case could be reviewed. 
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ths. 83-1362, 83-1363, and 83-6392 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 
and 
Parma Board of Education v. Donnelly. 
December 1, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether due process entitles a tenured state em-
ployee to some process before being discharged. 
Nos. 83-1362, 83-13_ , and 83-6392 - page 2. 
I. Background. 
Resps were employees of petr school districts. 
Under state law, they could be terminated only for cause. 
Resp Loudermill was discharged for misrepresenting on an 
initial employment form that he had never been convicted of 
a felony. Resp Donnelly was discharged for failing an eye 
test. Loudermill apparently received notice that he would 
be terminated only on the day of his discharge, while Don-
nelly received notice a month or so before his. Under Ohio 
law, each was entitled to a full post-deprivation hearing. 
Neither, however, was entitled to any pre-termination proc-
ess at all. The State law denied them not only a pre-
termination hearing, but also the right to submit oral or 
written evidence, information, or arguments before they 
were fired. During post-termination review, an ALJ recom-
mended that Loudermill be rehired but his discharge was 
upheld on further appeal. Donnelly, on the other hand, was 
reinstated but without back pay. Under Ohio law, the State 
reviewing agency can reinstate wrongfully dismissed employ-
ees but not award them back pay. 
Resps then filed separate §1983 actions in federal 
court alleging that the absence of pre-termination process 
(except th✓re notice of termination) violated due proc-
ess. The DC dismissed the claim by following JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST'S reasoning in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 341 
(1974), that the property interest came with procedural 
• 
tbs. 83-1362, 83-13_ , and 83-6392 - page 3 • 
strings attached. Taking "the bitter with the sweet," 
resps were entitled to no pre-termination process above 
what state law provided. Upon reconsideration, the DC is-
sued a subsequent opinion where it found that there was a 
property interest but that the post-termination hearings 
provided by Ohio law satisfied due process requirements. 
✓ 
'Ihe CA6 (Merritt, Timbers [sca2]; Wellford cone. & 
diss.) held that the absence of any pre-termination process 




It did not find that a pre-termination hearing was ---but rather held that due process required that 
given "an opportunity to present evidence chal-- -- ---leng i ng ~ the proEosed discharges II App. to Pet. for .... 
Cert. A26. It carefully weighed the Mathews v. Eldridge 
factors and found that 11 [p] roviding a limited opportunity 
to present evidence before dismissal is critical to ensure 
that the proper governmental response ensues. 11 Id. , at 
A24. As to the other two factors, the CA6 found that the 
individual's interest in continued employment was great and 
that the government's interest in not providing limited 
process was small. Al though the CA6 never makes explicit 
exactly what kind of limited pre-termination process is 
required, its repeated mention of the limited nature of the 
required process suggests that consideration of written or 
oral submissions of evidence and arguments against dismiss-
al would probably suffice. The CA6 remanded to the DC to 
;,~11-h 
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allow resps to prove that they sustained damages from the 
State's failure to provide any pre-termination process. 
~ dge Wellford dissented on two grounds. First, 
although he admitted that a majority of this Court had nev-
er adopted JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S theory of conditional prop-
erty interests in Arnett v. Kennedy, he found that "[t]he 
property interest which appellants had in their continued 
state or public employment 'was itself conditioned by the 
procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of 
that interest.'" Id., at A31 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974) (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.}. Sec-
ond, assuming that there was a limited property interest, 
he found the overall process provided adequate under this 
Court's precedents primarily because there was a "reliable 
pretermination finding." Id., at A33. 
II. Discussion. 
The case presents two issues: (i) whether the leg-
islature can condition entitlements on receiving certain 
limited procedural protections and (ii) whether @L pre-
termination process is required before firing tenured state 
employees? The first issue presents JUSTICE REHNQUIST Is 
Arnett v. Kennedy due process theory. Since you, along 
with a majority of the Court, rejected it then and it 
stands at odds with your opinion for the Court in Mathews 
v. Eldridge and other Supreme Court precedents, I will not 
• 
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discuss it. It would work a major constitutional change 
c11d have effects outside the entitlement context. ~ 
Given your prior opinions and Supreme Court 
g:ecedent, the answer to the second question also seems 
✓ 
clear. Last Term, for example, in Davis v. Scherer, 52 
u.s.L.w. 4956, 4958 n.10 (U.S. June 28, 1984) (citations 
omitted) you stated: 
11 [T] he decisions of this Court by 1978 had re-
quired 'some kind of hearing ' prior to di~charge 
of _ and em..e_loyee who had a constitutionally pro-
tecte property interest in his employment. But 
the Court had not determined what kind of a hear-
ing must be provided. Such a determination would 
require a careful balancing of the competing 
interests--of the employee and the State--
implicated in the official decision at issue. As 
the Court had considered circumstances in which 
ro hearing at all had been provided prior toter-
mination or in which the requirements of due 
P=ocess were met, there had been no occasion to 
specify any minimally aceptable procedures for 








.furthermore, in your opinions in both Arnett and Mathews, 
you thought significant the fact that ~ pre-termination 
process was available. In fact, the second factor of the 
Eldridge test determines in part 11 the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 11 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (emphasis added). Here there were 
none to begin with--at least prior to termination. 
The facts of these two cases emphasize the risk of 
error when the State provides no pre-termination process at 
all. Termination "for cause" is discretionary with the 
State. Although the State can terminate someone's employ-
ment on numerous grounds, termination does not appear to be 
-
• 
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automatic when one of those grounds is met. In Donnelly's 
case, for example, the Board had not fired other employees 
who had failed the same eye test. Although the Board al-
lowed Donnelly to retake the eye test, which he failed 
again, it did not allow him to argue any of the discretion-
ary factors which appear eventually to have won him his job 
back. Had the Board initially allowed submission of such 
arguments, chances are that Donnelly would not have lost 
his job. 
Loudermill presents a somewhat similar, but less 
sympathetic, situation. He was dismissed for representing 
on a initial employment form that he had never been con-
victed of a felony. From the briefs and appendix it is 
unclear exactly what happened, but there appears to be some 
doubt whether he actually lied on the form or was genuinely 
confused as to the nature of the crime. There is no indi-
cation, moreover, whether the crime was a violent felony or 
something like check-kiting. In any event, the Board did 
not dismiss him for security reasons as it undoubtedly had 
the right to. Had it done so, it is extremely doubtful 
that he could claim a right to any pre-termination process. 
Instead, the Board fired Loudermill solely for misrepresen-
tation. The ALJ who investigated his claim recommended 
reinstatement but was overruled on appeal. Thus, it does 
appear that although Loudermill misrepresented his past 
there may have been some doubt as to the appropriateness of 
termination. In any case, since full post-termination 
Nos. 83-1362, 83-13 - and 83-6392 - page 7. 
hearings did not result in reinstatement, Loudermill will 
probably be barred on remand from receiving more than nomi-
nal damages under Carey v. Piphus. 
Both individual cases, particularly 
cast doubt on Judge Wellford's belief as 
Donnelly's, 
to "reliable 
pretermination findings." There 
findings that Donnelly failed 
is no question that the 
his eye test and that 
I.oudermill misrepresented his past are reliable. Termina-
tion is discretionary, however, not automatic. The issue 
is whether there were "reliable pretermination findings" as 
to the factors that guide the Board's exercise of its dis-
cretion. As to these factors, there appear to be no 
pretermination findings at all--let alone reliable ones. 
III. Summary 
Your prior opinions and other cases of this Court 
indicate that there was a property interest at stake and 
that ~pretermination process was necessary. Unless you 
or the Court deviate from these prior positions, there is a 
due process violation here. One issue remains, however. 
If this Court finds a due process violation, should it de-
scribe what kinds of pre-termination process are required 
in this context? The case certainly presents an opportuni-
ty for the Court to do so, but I am not sure it should. 
For one thing, it is not necessary to do so in order to 
decide the case. Since the CA6 remanded only for a deter-
'r-
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mination of damages for lack of ~ process at all, there 
is no need to prescribe standards in this case. For anoth-
er thing, what process is due always depends on the context 
of the case and the interests involved. The school boards 
should be given a chance to design their own procedures 
without unnecessary interference from the courts. 
Recommendation 
I recommend affirming the CA6. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 83-1362, 83-1363 AND 83-6392 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER 
83-1362 v. 
JAMES LOUDERMILL ET AL. 
PARMA BOARD OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER 
83-1363 v. 
RICHARD DONNELLY ET AL. 
JAMES LOUDERMILL, PETITIONER 
~-~~ u 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In these cases we consider what pretermination process 
must be accorded a public employee who can be discharged 
only for cause. 
I 
In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education, petitioner in 
No. 83-1362, hired respondent James Loudermill as a secu-
rity guard. On his job application, Loudermill stated that he 
had never been convicted of a felony. Eleven months later, 
as part of a routine examination of his employment records, 
the Board discovered that in fact Loudermill had been con-
victed of grand larceny in 1968. By letter dated November 
3, 1980, the Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill 
that he had been dismissed because of his dishonesty in filling 
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forded an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty 
or to challenge his dismissal. On November 13, the Board 
adopted a resolution officially approving the discharge. 
Under Ohio law, Loudermill was "classified civil servant." ~ 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.11. Su~h employees can be ter-
minated only for cause, and may obtain administrative re-
view if discharged. § 124.34. Pursuant to this provision, 
Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service 
Commission on November 12. The Commission appointed a 
referee, who held a hearing on January 29, 1981. 
Loudermill argued that he had thought that his 1968 larceny 
conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The 
referee· recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981, the 
full Commission heard argument and orally announced that it 
would uphold the dismissal. Proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law followed on August 10, and Loudermill's 
attorn~ys were advised of the result by mail on August 21. 
Although the Commission's decision was subject to judicial 
review in the state courts, Loudermill instead brought the 
present suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that§ 124.34 was un-
constitutional on its face because it did not provide the em-
ployee an opportunity to respond to the charges against him 
prior to removal. As a result, discharged employees were 
deprived of liberty and property without due process. The 
complaint also alleged that the provision was unconstitutional 
as applied because discharged employees were not given suf-
ficiently prompt post-removal hearings. 
Before a responsive pleading was filed, the District Court 
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). It held that 
because the very statute that created the property right in 
continued employment also specified the procedures for dis-
charge, and because those procedures were followed , 
Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process due. 
✓ 
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The post-termination hearing also adequately protected 
Loudermill's liberty interests. Finally, the District Court 
concluded that in light of the Commission's crowded docket, 
the delay in processing Loudermill's administrative appeal 
was constitutionally acceptable. App. to Pet. for Cert. in 
No. 83-1362, pp. A36-A42. 
The other case before us arises on similar facts and fol-
lowed a similar course. Respondent Richard Donnelly was a 
bus mechanic for the Parma Board of Education. In August 
1977, Donnelly was fired because he had failed an eye exami-
nation. He was offered a chance to retake the exam but did 
not do so. Like Loudermill, Donnelly appealed to the Civil 
Service Commission. After a year of wrangling about the 
timeliness of his appeal, the Commission heard the case. It 
ordered Donnelly reinstated, though without back pay. 1 In 
a complaint essentially identical to Loudermill's, Donnelly 
challenged the constitutionality of the dismissal procedures. 
The District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, rely-
ing on its opinion in Loudermill. 
1'he District Court denied a joint motion to alter or amend 
its judgment, 2 and the cases were consolidated for appeal. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
1 The statute authorizes the Commission to "affirm, disaffirm, or modify 
the judgment of the appointing authority." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34. 
Petitioner interprets this as authority to reinstate with or without back 
pay and views the Commission's decision as a compromise. Brief for Peti-
tioner in No. 83-1363, p. 6, n. 3; Tr. of Oral. Arg. 14. The Court of 
Appeals, however, stated that the Commission lacked the power to award 
back pay. 721 F. 2d 550, 554 n. 3 (1983). As the decision of the Commis-
sion is not in the record, we are unable to determine the reasoning behind 
it. 
2 In denying the motion, the District Court no longer relied on the prin-
ciple that the state legislature could define the necessary procedures in the 
course of creating the property right. Instead, it reached the same result 
under a balancing test based on JUSTICE POWELL'S concurring opinion in 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168-169 (1974), and the Court's opinion 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). App. to Pet. for Cert. in 
No. 83-1362, pp. A54-A57. 
- -
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reversed in part and remanded. 721 F. 2d 550 (1983). 
After rejecting arguments that the actions were barred by 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and by res 
judicata-arguments that are not renewed here-the Court 
of Appeals found that both respondents had been deprived of 
due process. It disagreed with the District Court's original 
rationale. Instead, it concluded that the compelling private 
interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of 
presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added 
administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. Id., at 
561-562. With regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty, 
and Loudermill's 9-month wait for an administrative decision, 
the court affirmed the District Court, finding no constitu-
tional violation. Id., at 563-564. 
The dissenting Judge argued that respondents' property 
interests were conditioned by the procedural limitations ac-
companying the grant thereof. He considered constitutional 
requirements satisfied because there was · a reliable 
pretermination finding of "cause," coupled with a due process 
hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
Id., at 566-567. 
Both employers petitioned for certiorari. Nos. 83-1362 & 
83-1363. In a cross-petition, Loudermill sought review of 
the rulings adverse to him. No. 83-6392. We granted all 
three petitions, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now affirm in all 
respects. 
II 
Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their 
having had a property right in continued employment. 3 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972); 
Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425 (1901). If they 
3 Of course, the Due Process Clause also protects interests of life and 
liberty. The Court of Appeals' finding of a constitutional violation was 
based solely on the deprivation of a property interest. We address below 
Loudermill's contention that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of lib-
erty. See n. 12, infra. 
- -
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did, the State could not deprive them of this property with-
out due process. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 
565, 573-574 (1975). 
Property interests are not created by the Constitution, 
"they are created and their dimensions are defined by exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law .... " Board of Regents v. Roth, 
supra, at 577. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 709 
(1976). The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. 
Respondents were "classified civil service employees," Ohio 
Rev. ·Code Ann. § 124.11, entitled to retain their positions 
"during good behavior and efficient service," who could not 
be dismissed "except ... for ... misfeasance, malfeasance, 
or nonfeasance in office," § 124.34. 4 The statute plainly sup-
ports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that re-
spondents possessed property rights in continued employ-
ment. Indeed, this question does not seem to have been 
disputed below. 5 
'The relevant portion of § 124.34 provides that no classified civil serv-
ant may be removed except "for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, 
drunkenness , immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of 
the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections of the rules of the 
director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure 
of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfea-
sance in office." 
5 The Cleveland Board of Education now asserts that Loudermill had no 
property right under state law because he obtained his employment by 
lying on the application. It argues that had Loudermill answered truth-
fully he would not have been hired. He therefore lacked a "legitimate 
claim of entitlement" to the position. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1362, 
pp. 14-15. . 
For several reasons, we must reject this submission. First, it was not 
raised below. Second, it makes factual assumptions-that Loudermill 
lied, and that he would not have been hired had he not done so-that are 
inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint and inappropriate at this 
stage of the litigation, which has not proceeded past the initial pleadings 
stage. Finally, the argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent 
• -
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The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right 
is defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of 
procedures for its deprivation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 
83-1363, pp. 26-27. The Board stresses that in addition to 
specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out 
procedures by which termination may take place. 6 The pro-
cedures were adhered to in these cases. According to peti-
tioner, "[t]o require additional procedures would in effect ex-
pand the scope of the property interest itself." Id., at 27. 
See also Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5-10. 
This argument, which was accepted by the District Court, 
has its genesis in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. ·S. 134 (1974). Arnett involved a challenge by a for-
mer federal employee to the procedures by which he was dis-
missed. The plurality reasoned that where the legislation 
conferring the substantive right also sets out the procedural 
mechanism for enforcing that right, the two cannot be 
separated: 
"The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guar-
antee against removal without cause in the abstract, but 
such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which 
Congress has designated for the determination of 
with the undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired and did hold the secu-
rity guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional obligations by 
rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why Loudermill should not 
have been hired in the first place. 
6 After providing for dismissal only for cause, see n. 4, supra, § 124.34 
states that the dismissed employee is to be provided with a copy of the 
order ofremoval giving the reasons therefor. Within ten days of the filing 
of the order with the director of administrative services, the employee may 
file a written appeal with the state personnel board of review or the Com-
rruss10n. "In the event such an appeal is filed , the board or commission 
shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a 
trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing 
with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the 
judgment of the appointing authority." Either side may obtain review of 
the commission's decision in the state court of common pleas. 
- -
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cause. . . . [W]here the grant of a substantive right is 
inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the pro-
cedures which are to be employed in determining that 
right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the 
bitter with the sweet." Id., at 152-154. 
This view garnered three votes in Arnett, but was specifi-
cally rejected by the other six Justices. See id., at 166-167 
(POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.,); id., at 177-178, 185 
(WHITE, J.,); id., at 211 (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas 
and BRENNAN, JJ.). Since then, this theory has at times 
seemed to gather some additional support. See Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976); id., at 355-361 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 586-587 (1975) (POW-
ELL, J., joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and BLACKMUN and 
REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting). More recently, however, the 
Court has clearly rejected it. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 
480, 491 (1980), we pointed out that "minimum [procedural] 
requirements [are] a matter of fed"eral law, they are not di-
minished by the fact that the State may have specified its 
own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining 
the preconditions to adverse official action." This conclusion 
was reiterated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 
U. S. 422, 432 (1982), where we reversed the lower court's 
holding that because the entitlement arose from a state stat-
ute, the legislature had the prerogative to define the proce-
dures to be followed to protect that entitlement. 
In light of these holdings, it is settled that the "bitter with 
the sweet" approach misconceives the constitutional guaran-
tee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. 
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause pro-
vides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and prop-
erty-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally 
adequate procedures. The categories of substance and pro-
cedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause 
would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot 
be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any 
• -
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more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is 
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional 
guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a 
property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitu-
tionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once 
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." 
Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 166 (POWELL, J., concurring); 
see id., at 185 (WHITE, J., concurring). 
In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause 
applies, "the question remains what process is due." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The answer 
to that question is not to be found in the Ohio statute. 
III 
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 
Mullane v. · Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 313 (1950). We have described "the root requirement" 
of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be 
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of 
any significant property interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542 (1971). This principle requires 
"some kind of a hearing" prior to the discharge of an em-
ployee who has a constitutionally protected property interest 
in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 
564, 569-570 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593, 599 
(1972). As we pointed out last Term, this rule has been set-
tled for some time now. Davis v. Scherer, -- U. S. --, 
-- n. 10 (1984); id., at -- (BRENNAN, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Even decisions finding no con-
stitutional violation in termination procedures have relied on 
the existence of some pre-termination opportunity to re-
spond. For example, in Arnett six Justices found constitu-
tional minima satisfied where the employee had access to the 
• -
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material upon which the charge was based and could respond 
orally and in writing and present rebuttal affidavits. See 
also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 65 (1979) (no due process 
violation where horse trainer whose license was suspended 
"was given more than one opportunity to present his side of 
the story"). 
The need for some form of pre-termination hearing, recog-
nized in these cases, is evident from a balancing of the com-
peting interests at stake. These are the private interest in 
retaining employment, the governmental interest in the ex-
peditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoid-
ance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous 
termination. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 
(1976). 
First, the significance of the private interest in retaining 
employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recog-
nized the severity of depriving a person -of the means of liveli-
hood. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 340 (1969). While a fired worker may 
find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and 
is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances 
under which he left his previous job. See Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 83-84 (1973). 
Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his 
side of the case is of obvious value in reaching an accurate de-
c1s10n. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual. dis-
putes. Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 686 (1979). 
Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or neces-
sity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only 
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the 
decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes 
effect. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975); 
• -
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Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 784-786 (1973). 7 
The cases before us illustrate these considerations. Both 
respondents had plausible arguments to make that might 
have prevented their discharge. The fact that the Commis-
sion saw fit to reinstate Donnelly suggests that an error 
might have been avoided had he been provided an opportu-
nity to make his case to the Board. As for Loudermill, given 
the Commission's ruling we cannot say that the discharge 
was mistaken. Nonetheless, in light of the referree's recom-
mendation, neither can we say that a fully informed 
decisionmaker might not have exercised its discretion and 
decided not to dismiss him, notwithstanding its authority to 
do so. In any event, the termination involved arguable is-
sues, 8 and the right to a hearing does not depend on a dem-
onstration of certain success. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 
247, 266 (19'Z8). 
The governmental interest in immediate termination does 
not outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording 
'This is not to say that where state conduct is entirely discretionary the 
Due Process Clause is brought into play. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U. S. 215, 228 (1976). Nor is it to say that a person can insist on a hearing 
in order to argue that the decisionmaker should be lenient and depart from 
legal requirements. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 114 (1977). The 
point is that where there is an entitlement, a prior hearing facilitates the 
consideration of whether a permissible course of action is also an appropri-
ate one. This is one way in which providing "effective notice and informal 
hearing permitting the [employee] to give his version of the events will 
provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action. At least the [em-
ployer] will be alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
ments about cause and effect. . . . [H]is discretion will be more in-
formed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced." Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975). 
8 Loudermill's dismissal turned not on the objective fact that he was an 
ex-felon or the inaccuracy of his statement to the contrary, but on the sub-
jective question whether he had lied on his application form. His explana-
tion for the false statement is plausible in light of the fact that he received 
only a suspended 6-month sentence and a fine on the grand larceny 
conviction. 
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the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination 
would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor 
intolerable delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the 
employee's interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous 
decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employee would 
continue to receive the benefits of the employee's labors. It 
is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a 
new one. A governmental employer also has an interest in 
keeping citizens usefully employed rather than taking the 
possibly erroneous and counter-productive step of forcing the 
employee onto the welfare rolls . . Finally, in those situations 
where the employer perceives a significant hazard in keeping 
the employee on the job, 9 it can avoid the problem by sus-
pending with pay. 
IV 
The foregoing considerations indicate that the pre-termina-
tion "hearing," though necessary, need not be elaborate. 
We have pointed out that "[t]he formality and procedural 
requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the im-
portance of the interests involved and the nature of the sub-
sequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 
371, 378 (1971). See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U. S. 886, 894-895 (1961). In general, "something less" than 
a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse admin-
istrative action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 343. 
• In the cases before us, no such danger seems to have existed. The 
exam Donnelly failed was related to driving school buses, not repairing 
them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40. As the Court of Appeals stated, "no emer-
gency was even conceivable with respect to Donnelly. " 721 F. 2d, at 562. 
As for Loudermill, petitioner states that "to find that we have a person 
who is an ex-felon as our security guard is very distressful to us." Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 19. But the termination was based on the presumed misrep-
resentation on the employment form, not on the felony conviction. In fact, 
Ohio law provides that an employee "shall not be disciplined for acts," in-
cluding criminal convictions, occuring more than two years previously. 
See Ohio Admin. Code § 124-3-04. Petitioner concedes that Loudermill's 
job performance was fully satisfactory. 
• -
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Under state law, respondents were later entitled to a full 
administrative hearing and judicial review. The only ques-
tion is what steps were required before the termination took 
effect. 
In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), 
has the Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing 
prior to adverse governmental action. However, as the 
Goldberg Court itself pointed out, see id., at 264, that case 
presented significantly different considerations than are 
present in the context of public employment. Here, the 
pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve tpe pro-
priety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against 
mistake_n decisions-essentially, a probable-cause determina-
tion as to whether the charges brought against the employee 
are true and support the proposed action. See Bell v. 
Burson, supra1 at 540. 
The essential requirements of due process, and all that re-
spondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice . 
and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present 
reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action 
should not be taken is a fundamental due process require-
ment. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 126'7, 1281 (1975). The tenured public employee is enti-
tled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy , supra, 
at 170-171 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id. , at 195-196 (opinion of 
WHITE, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 581 (1975). 
To require more than this prior to termination would intrude 
to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in 
quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 
V 
Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a 
full post-termination hearing. In his cross-petition 
Loudermill asserts, as a separate constitutional violation, 
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that his administrative proceedings took too long. 10 The 
Court of Appeals held otherwise, and we agree. 11 The Due 
Process Clause requires provision of a hearing "at a meaning-
ful time." E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 
(1965). At some point, a delay in the post-termination hear-
ing would become a constitutional violation. See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 66 (1979). In the present case, how-
ever, the delay stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the 
procedures. The chronology of the proceedings set out in 
Loudermill's complaint, coupled with the assertion that nine 
months is too long to wait, does not state a claim of a con-
stitutional deprivation. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 
319, 341-342 (1976) (delay of over a year acceptable); Arnett 
v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 157-158 (1976) (delays of over 
three months acceptable). 12 
10 Loudermill's hearing before the referee occurred two and one-half 
months after he filed his appeal. The Commission issued its written deci-
sion six and one-half months after that. Administrative proceedings in 
Donnelly's case, once it was determined that they could proceed at all, 
were swifter. A writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to hold a 
hearing was issued on May 9, 1978; the hearing took place on May 30; the 
order of reinstatement was issued on July 6. 
Section 124.34 provides that a hearing is to be held within 30 days of the 
appeal, though the Ohio courts have held that the time limit is not manda-
tory. E.g. , In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc. 13, 17, 372 N. E. 2d 1345, 1347 
(1977). The statute does not provide a time limit for the actual decision. 
11 It might be argued that once we find a due process violation in the 
denial of a pretermination hearing we need not and should not consider 
whether the post-termination procedures were adequate. See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 72-74 (1979) (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting in part). We 
CO?lclude that it is appopriate to consider it, however, for three reasons. 
First, the allegation of a distinct due process violation in the administrative 
delay is not an alternative theory supporting the same relief, but a · sepa-
rate claim altogether. Second, it was decided by the court below and is 
raised in a cross-petition. Finally, the existence of post-termination pro-
cedures is relevant to the scope of pretermination procedures. 
12 The cross-petition also argues that Loudermill was unconstitutionally 
deprived of liberty because of the accusation of dishonesty that hung over 
his head during the administrative proceedings. As the Court of Appeals 
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VI 
We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by 
a pre-termination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-
termination administrative procedures as provided by the 
Ohio statute. Because respondents allege in their com-
plaints that they had no chance to respond, the District Court 
erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the case re-· 
manded for futher proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
found, 721 F. 2d, at 563, n. 18, the failure to allege that the reasons for the 
dismissal were published dooms this claim. See Bisho-p v. Wood, 426 
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forded an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty 
or to challenge his dismissal. On November 13, the Board 
adopted a resolution officially approving the discharge. 
Under Ohio law, Loudermill was "classified civil servant." ~ 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.11. Su'~h employees can be ter-
minated only for cause, and may obtain administrative re-
view if discharged. § 124.34. Pursuant to this provision, 
Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service 
Commission on November 12. The Commission appointed a 
referee, who held a hearing on January 29, 1981. 
Loudermill argued that he had thought that his 1968 larceny 
conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The 
referee· recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981, the 
full Commission heard argument and orally announced that it 
would uphold the dismissal. Proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law followed on August 10, and Loudermill's 
attorneys were advised of the result by mail on August 21. 
Although the Commission's decision was subject to judicial 
review in the state courts, Loudermill instead brought the 
present suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that§ 124.34 was un-
constitutional on its face because it did not provide the em-
ployee an opportunity to respond to the charges against him 
prior to removal. As a result, discharged employees were 
deprived of liberty and property without due process. The 
complaint also alleged that the provision was unconstitutional 
as applied because discharged employees were not given suf-
ficiently prompt post-removal hearings. 
Before a responsive pleading was filed, the District Court 
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief cou:ld be 
granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). It held that 
because the very statute that created the property right in 
continued employment also specified the procedures for dis-
charge, and because those procedures were followed, 
Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process due. 
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The post-termination hearing also adequately protected 
Loudermill's liberty interests. Finally, the District Court 
concluded that in light of the Commission's crowded docket, 
the delay in processing Loudermill's administrative appeal 
was constitutionally acceptable. App. to Pet. for Cert. in 
No. 83- 1362, pp. A36-A42. 
The other case before us arises on similar facts and fol-
lowed a similar course. Respondent Richard Donnelly was a 
bus mechanic for the Parma Board of Education. In August 
1977, Donnelly was fired because he had failed an eye exami-
nation. He was offered a chance to retake the exam but did 
not do so. Like Loudermill, Donnelly appealed to the Civil 
Service Commission. After a year of wrangling about the 
timeliness of his appeal, the Commission heard the case. It 
ordered Donnelly reinstated, though without back pay. 1 In 
a complaint essentially identical to Loudermill's, Donnelly 
challenged the constitutionality of the dismissal procedures. 
The District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, rely-
ing on its opinion in Loudermill. 
The District Court denied a joint motion to alter or amend 
its judgment, 2 and the cases were consolidated for appeal. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
1 The statute authorizes the Commission to "affirm, disaffirm, or modify 
the judgment of the appointing authority. " Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34. 
Petitioner interprets this as authority to reinstate with or without back 
pay and views the Commission's decision as a compromise. Brief for Peti-
tioner in No. 83-1363, p. 6, n. 3; Tr. of Oral. Arg. 14. The Court of 
Appeals, however, stated that the Commission lacked the power to award 
back pay. 721 F . 2d 550, 554 n. 3 (1983). As the decision of the Commis-
sion is not in the record , we are unable to determine the reasoning behind 
it. 
2 In denying the motion, the District Court no longer relied on the prin-
ciple that the state legislature could define the necessary procedures in the 
course of creating the property right. Instead, it reached the same result 
under a balancing test based on J USTICE POWELL'S concurring opinion in 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168- 169 (1974), and the Court's opinion 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). App. to Pet. for Cert. in 
No. 83-1362, pp. A54-A57. 
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reversed in part and remanded. 721 F. 2d 550 (1983). 
After rejecting arguments that the actions were barred by 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and by res 
judicata-arguments that are not renewed here-the Court 
of Appeals found that both respondents had been deprived of 
due process. It disagreed with the District Court's original 
rationale. Instead, it concluded that the compelling private 
interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of 
presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added 
administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. Id., at 
561-562. With regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty, 
and Loudermill's 9-month wait for an administrative decision, 
the court affirmed the District Court, finding no constitu-
tional violation. Id., at 563-564. 
The dissenting Judge argued that respondents' property 
interests were conditioned by the procedural limitations ac-
companying the grant thereof. He considered constitutional 
requirements satisfied because there was a reliable 
pretermination finding of "cause," coupled with a due process 
hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
Id., at 566-567. 
Both employers petitioned for certiorari. Nos. 83-1362 & 
83-1363. In a cross-petition, Loudermill sought review of 
the rulings adverse to him. No. 83-6392. We granted all 
three petitions, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now affirm in all 
respects. 
II 
Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their 
having had a property right in continued employment. 3 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972); 
Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425 (1901). If they 
3 Of course, the Due Process Clause also protects interests of life and 
liberty. The Court of Appeals' finding of a constitutional violation was 
based solely on the deprivation of a property interest. We address below 
Loudermill's contention that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of lib-
erty. See n. 12, infra. 
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did, the State could not deprive them of this property with-
out due process. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 
565, 573-574 (1975). 
Property interests are not created by the Constitution, 
"they are created and their dimensions are defined by exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law .. . . " Board of Regents v. Roth, 
supra, at 577. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 709 
(1976). The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. 
Respondents were "classified civil service employees," Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 124.11, entitled to retain their positions 
"during good behavior and efficient service," who could not 
be dismissed "except ... for ... misfeasance, malfeasance, 
or nonfeasance in office,"§ 124.34. 4 The statute plainly sup-
ports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that re-
spondents possessed property rights in continued employ-
ment. Indeed, this question does not seem to have been 
disputed below. 5 
' The relevant portion of § 124.34 provides that no classified civil serv-
ant may be removed except "for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, 
drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of 
the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections of the rules of the 
director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure 
of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfea-
sance in office." 
5 The Cleveland Board of Education now asserts that Loudermill had no 
property right under state law because he obtained his employment by 
lying on the application. It argues that had Loudermill answered truth-
fully he would not have been hired. He therefore lacked a "legitimate 
claim of entitlement" to the position. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1362, 
pp. 14-15. . . 
For several reasons , we must reject this submission. First, it was not 
raised below. Second, it makes factual assumptions-that Loudermill 
lied, and that he would not have been hired had he not done so-that are 
inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint and inappropriate at this 
stage of the litigation, which has not proceeded past the initial pleadings 
stage. Finally, the argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent 
. " 
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The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right 
is defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of 
procedures for its deprivation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 
83-1363, pp. 26-27. The Board stresses that in addition to 
specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out 
procedures by which termination may take place. 6 The pro-
cedures were adhered to in these cases. According to peti-
tioner, "[t]o require additional procedures would in effect ex-
pand the scope of the property interest itself." Id., at 27. 
See also Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5-10. 
This argument, which was accepted by the District Court, 
has its genesis in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. S. 134 (1974). Arnett involved a challenge by a for-
mer federal employee to the procedures by which he was dis-
missed. The plurality reasoned that where the legislation 
conferring the substantive right also sets out the procedural 
mechanism for enforcing that right, the two cannot be 
separated: 
"The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guar-
antee against removal without cause in the abstract, but 
such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which 
Congress has designated for the determination of 
with the undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired and did hold the secu-
rity guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional obligations by 
rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why Loudermill should not 
have been hired in the first place . 
6 After providing for dismissal only for cause, see n. 4, supra, § 124.34 
states that the dismissed employee is to be provided with a copy of the 
order of removal giving the reasons therefor. Within ten days of the filing 
of the order with the director of administrative services, the employee may 
file a written appeal with the state personnel board of review or the Com-
m.1ss10n. "In the event such an appeal is filed , the board or commission 
shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a 
trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing 
with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the 
judgment of the appointing authority." Either side may obtain review of 
the commission's decision in the state court of common pleas. 
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cause. . . . [W]here the grant of a substantive right is 
inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the pro-
cedures which are to be employed in determining that 
right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the 
bitter with the sweet." Id., at 152-154. 
This view garnered three votes in Arnett, but was specifi-
cally rejected by the other six Justices. See id., at 166-167 
(POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.,); id., at 177-178, 185 
(WHITE, J.,); id., at 211 (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas 
and BRENNAN, JJ.). Since then, this theory has at times 
seemed to gather some additional support. See Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976); id., at 355-361 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 586-587 (1975) (POW-
ELL, J., joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and BLACKMUN and 
REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting). More recently, however, the 
Court has clearly rejected it. In Vitek v. Jones , 445 U. S. 
480, 491 (1980), we pointed out that "minimum [procedural] 
requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not di-
minished by the fact that the State may have specified its 
own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining . 
the preconditions to adverse official action." This conclusion 
was reiterated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 
U. S. 422, 432 (1982), where we reversed the lower court's 
holding that because the entitlement arose from a state stat-
ute, the legislature had the prerogative to define the proce-
dures to be followed to protect that entitlement. 
In light of these holdings, it is settled that the "bitter with 
the sweet" approach misconceives the constitutional guaran-
tee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. 
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause pro-
vides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and prop-
erty-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally 
adequate procedures. The categories of substance and pro-
cedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause 
would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot 
be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any 
- -
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more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is 
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional 
guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a 
property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitu-
tionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once 
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." 
Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 166 (POWELL, J., concurring}; 
see id., at 185 (WHITE, J., concurring). 
In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause 
applies, "the question remains what process is due." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The answer 
to that question is not to be found in the Ohio statute. 
III 
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 
306, 313 (1950). We have described "the root requirement" 
of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be 
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of 
any significant property interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542 (1971). This principle requires 
"some kind of a hearing" prior to the discharge of an em-
ployee who has a constitutionally protected property interest 
in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 
564, 569-570 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593, 599 
(1972). As we pointed out last Term, this rule has been set-
tled for some time now. Davis v. Scherer, -- U.S.--, 
-- n. 10 (1984); id., at -- (BREN NAN, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Even decisions finding no con-
stitutional violation in termination procedures have relied on 
the existence of some pre-termination opportunit to re-
spond. For example, m rne six us ices found constitu-
tional minima satisfied where the employee had access to the 
~~ 
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material upon which the charge was based and could respond 
orally and in writing and present rebuttal affidavits. See 
also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 65 (1979) (no due process 
violation where horse trainer whose license was suspended 
"was given more than one opportunity to present his side of 
the story"). 
The need for some form of pre-termination hearing, recog-
nized in these cases, is evident from a balancing of the com-
peting interests at stake. These are the private interest in 
retaining employment, the governmental interest in the ex-
peditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoid-
ance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous 
termination. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 
(1976). 
First, the significance of the private interest in retaining 
employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recog-
nized the severity of depriving a person of the means of liveli-
hood. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 340 (1969). While a fired worker may 
find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and 
is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances 
under which he left his previous job. See Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 83- 84 (1973). 
Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his 
side of the case is of obvious value in reaching an accurate de-
c1s10n. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual dis-
putes. Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 686 (1979). 
Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or neces-
sity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only 
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the 
decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes 
effect. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975); 
- -
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Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 784-786 (1973). 7 
The cases before us illustrate these considerations. Both 
respondents had plausible arguments to make that might 
have prevented their discharge. The fact that the Commis-
sion saw fit to reinstate Donnelly suggests that an error 
might have been avoided had he been provided an opportu-
nity to make his case to the Boarq. As for Loudermill, given 
the Commission's ruling we cannot say that the discharge 
was mistaken. Nonetheless, in light of the referree's recom-
mendation, neither can we say that a fully informed· 
decisionmaker might not have exercised its discretion and 
decided not to dismiss him, notwithstanding its authority to 
do so. In any event, the termination involved arguable is-
sues, 8 and the right to a hearing does not depend on a dem-
onstration of certain success. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 
247, 266 (1978). 
The governmental interest in immediate termination does 
not outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording 
7 This is not to say that where state conduct is entirely discretionary the 
Due Process Clause is brought into play. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U. S. 215, 228 (1976). Nor is it to say that a person can insist on a hearing 
in order to argue that the decisionmaker should be lenient and depart from 
legal requirements. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 114 (1977). The 
point is that where there is an entitlement, a prior hearing facilitates the 
consideration of whether a permissible course of action is also an appropri-
ate one. This is one way in which providing "effective notice and informal 
hearing permitting the [employee] to give his version of the events will 
provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action. At least the [em-
ployer] will be alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
ments about cause and effect. . . . [H]is discretion will be more in-
formed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced. " Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975). 
8 Loudermill's dismissal turned not on the objective fact that he was an 
ex-felon or the inaccuracy of his statement to the contrary, but on the sub-
jective question whether he had lied on his application form. His explana-
tion for the false statement is plausible in light of the fact that he received 
only a suspended 6-month sentence and a fine on the grand larceny 
conviction. 
- -
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the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination 
would im ose neither a significant administrative burden nor 
into erable delays. urt ermore, the employer shares the 
employee's interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous 
decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employee would 
continue to receive the benefits of the employee's labors. It 
is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a 
new one. A governmental employer also has an interest in 
keeping citizens usefully employed rather than taking the 
possibly erroneous and counter-productive step of forcing the 
employee onto the welfare rolls. Finally, in those situations 
where the employer perceives a significant hazard in keeping 
the employee on the job,9 it can avoid the problem by sus-
pending with pay. 
IV 
The foregoing considerations indicate that the pre-termina-
tion "hearing," though necessary, need not be elaborate. 
We have pointed out that "[t]he formality and procedural 
requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the im-
portance of the interests involved and the nature of the sub-
sequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 
371, 378 (1971). See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U. S. 886, 894- 895 (1961). In general, "something less" than 
a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse admin-
istrative action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 343. 
9 In the cases before us, no such danger seems to have existed. The 
exam Donnelly failed was related to driving school buses, not repairing 
them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40. As the Court of Appeals stated, "no emer-
gency was even conceivable with respect to Donnelly." 721 F. 2d, at 562. 
As for Loudermill, petitioner states that "to find that we have a person 
who is an ex-felon as our security guard is very distressful to us." Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 19. But the termination was based on the presumed misrep-
resentation on the employment form, not on the felony conviction. In fact, 
Ohio law provides that an employee "shall not be disciplined for acts," in-
cluding criminal convictions, occuring more than two years previously. 
See Ohio Admin. Code § 124-3-04. Petitioner concedes that Loudermill's 
job performance was fully satisfactory. 
. ~ 
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Under state law, respondents were later entitled to a full 
administrative hearing and judicial review. The only ques-
tion is what steps were required before the termination took 
effect. 
In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), 
has the Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing 
prior .to adverse governmental action. However, as the 
Goldberg Court itself pointed out, see id., at 264, that case 
presented significantly different. considerations than are 
present in the context of public employment. Here, the 
pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the pro-
priety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against 
mistaken decisions-essentially, a probable-cause determina-
. ~
~as to whether the charges brought against the employee 
are true and support the proposed action. See Bell v. 
Burson, supra, at 540. 
The essential requirements of due process, and all that re-
spondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice 
·anaafiopportunity to respond. The opportunity to present 
reasons, e1tnerln person or in writing, why proposed action 
should not be taken is a fundamental due process require-
ment. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1267, 1281 .(1975). The tenured public employee is enti-
tled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 
at 170-171 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at 195-196 (opinion of 
WHITE, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 581 (1975). 
To require more than this prior to termination would intrude 
to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in 
quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 
V 
Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a 
full post-termination hearing. In his cross-petition 
Loudermill asserts, as a separate constitutional violation, 
;;, 
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that his administrative proceedings took too long. 10 The 
Court of Appeals held otherwise, and we agree. 11 The Due 
Process Clause requires provision of a hearing "at a meaning-
ful time." E. g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 
(1965). At some point, a delay in the post-termination hear-
ing would become a constitutional violation. See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 66 (1979). In the present case, how-
ever, the delay stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the 
procedures. The chronology of the proceedings set out in 
Loudermill's complaint, coupled with the assertion that nine 
months is too long to wait, does not state a claim of a con-
stitutional deprivation. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 
319, 341-342 (1976) (delay of over a year acceptable); Arnett 
v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 157-158 (1976) (delays of over 
three months acceptable). 12 
10 Loudermill's hearing before the referee occurred two and one-half 
months after he filed his appeal. The Commission issued its written deci-
sion six and one-half months after that. Administrative proceedings in 
Donnelly's case, once it was determined that they could proceed at all, 
were swifter. A writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to hold a 
hearing was issued on May 9, 1978; the hearing took place on May 30; the 
order of reinstatement was issued on July 6. 
Section 124. 34 provides that a hearing is to be held within 30 days of the 
appeal, though the Ohio courts have held that the time limit is not manda-
tory. E.g. , In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc. 13, 17,372 N. E. 2d 1345, 1347 
(1977). The statute does not provide a time limit for the actual decision. 
11 It might be argued that once we find a due process violation in the 
denial of a pretermination hearing we need not and should not consider 
whether the post-termination procedures were adequate. See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 72-74 (1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting in part) . We 
conclude that it is appopriate to consider it, however, for three reasons. 
First, the allegation of a distinct due process violation in the administrative 
delay is not an alternative theory supporting the same relief, but a ·sepa-
rate claim altogether. Second, it was decided by the court below and is 
raised in a cross-petition. Finally, the existence of post-termination pro-
cedures is relevant to the scope of pretermination procedures. 
12 The cross-petition also argues that Loudermill was unconstitutionally 
deprived of liberty because of the accusation of dishonesty that hung over 
his head during the administrative proceedings. As the Court of Appeals 
- -
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VI 
We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by 
a pre-termination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-
termination administrative procedures as provided by the 
Ohio statute. Because respondents allege in their com-
plaints that they had no chance to respond, the District Court 
erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim. .The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the case re-
manded for futher proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
found, 721 F. 2d, at 563, n. 18, the failure to allege that the reasons for the 
dismissal were published dooms this claim. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 












Re: JUSTICE WHITE'S 1st Draft of Cleveland Bd. of Education v. 
Loudermill, No. 83-1362, and companion cases. 
JUSTICE WHITE has written a very good opinion which fi-
nally puts to rest the "bitter with the sweet" theory propounded 
by JUSTICE REHNQUIST in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
I recommend you join after possibly asking JUSTICE WHITE to con-
sider dropping pa~t of one sentence in the opinion. On page 12 
of the slip opinion, JUSTICE WHITE states that "the 
pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propri-
ety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against mis-
taken decisions--essentially, a probable-cause determination as 
to whether the charges brought against the employee are true and 
support the proposed action. See Bell v. Burson, supra, at 540." 
My only worry concerns his characterization of the hearing as 
involving "essentially, a probable-cause determination." The 
Bell v. Burson citation states that a motorist cannot be required 
to post security covering all claims made against him as a result 
of an accident unless the State determines that there is a "rea--
sonable possbili ty" that he will eventually be found liable on 
~
• - - page 2. 
the claims. Although I agree that in the employment context the 
pretermination determination would look something like a 
probable-cause determination, I fear that this term is so loaded 
with meaning from the Fourth Amendment that it would be unwise to 
use it here--especially when there is no real need to. Not only 
might use of the term yoke conceptions of due process to evolving 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but it might also short-circuit 
serious Mathews v. Eldridge analysis in the lower courts. Since 
all District Court judges have experience with probable-cause 
hearings, there may be a great temptation to require these kinds 
of pretermination hearings to resemble them in many respects. In 
other words, once the lower courts are given a "model II of the 
process required, they may overapply it. I recommend that you 
suggest dropping the reference to the "probable-cause determina-
tion." Otherwise, the opinion is fine. 
- • 
December 26 , J984 
83-1362 Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 
Dear Byron : 
I suggest one changp in your fine opinio~. On p. 
12, after saying t~at thP prPter~ination hearing n~e~ not 
definitively resolve the propri~ty of tbe ~ischarge , you 
refe~ to this hearing as essentially a "probable-cause de-
tPrmination". 
B~ll v. ~urson is citea ~or this etatnment. In 
Burson t--ie standf\nl is chr1r3cterize:! as "reasonable po~si-
bilitv." My concern a~out requiring a "probahl~-cause de-
termination" is that thi.s is Fourth Amen~ment language, and 
language t 1-int i:=; the snbjeC't of a great dP.3.l of 1. i.ti.gation. 
Our use of it ~ay invite~ reliance on criminal 1iw ,focisions 
in employment termination cases where the questinn is simply 
whether in light oF tbe shmdng rnaae by the empJ.oyN'! the 
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.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
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jluprmu ~ourl d lit~ ~b ,Jtatte 
'1uJtin¼lton. ~- ~- 2ll.;i'l, 
December 28, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1362) Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 
No. 83-1363) Parma Board of Education v. Donnelly 
No. 83-6392) Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
There is one confusing typo on page 11. Should not the word 
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-
December 31, 1984 
Re: 83-1362 - Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 
Dear Lewis, 
You are correct that Bell v. Burson spoke of "a reasonable 
possibility" rather than probable cause, but we later spoke of 
"probable cause" in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 64-66 -- "Even 
if the States' presuspension procedures were not adequate 
finally to resolve the issue fairly and accurately, they sufficed 
for the purposes of probable cause and interim suspension." I 
note also that Barry cited to Gerstein v. Pugh, 445 U.S., at 64. 
I am not wed to either formulation, however, and would be glad to 
refer to a standard of "reasonable grounds to believe." This 
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January 2, 1985 
Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, et al. 
Parma Board of Education v. Donnelly, 
al. 
Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of 
Education, et al. 
Please join me. I also agree with Lewis' 
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January 2, 1985 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 
Parma Board of Education v. Donnelly 
Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education 
In due course I will circulate a dissent. 
Sincerel~ 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
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-
CHAMl!IERS o,-
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
January 3, 1985 
Re: Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, No. 83-1362 
Parma Board of Educ. v. Donnelly, No. 83-1363 
Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Educ., No. 83-6392 
Dear Byron, 
I'm inclined to join parts I-IV of your opinion, but do have 
some questions regarding part V, which addresses the length of 
time between the filing of Loudermill's appeal and a final 
decision from the Commission. 
My initial problem arises from uncertainty as to exactly 
what question is addressed in part V. Is it whether a nine-month 
delay following a termination that was accomplished with no 
pretermination opportunity to respond is constitutional? That is 
the situation actually presented by the facts of Loudermill's 
case. So stated, I would think that the result in parts I-IV 
necessarily answers the question, in that we already find that 
the lack of pretermination procedure alone violated Loudermill's 
rights. Or is the question in part V instead whether the delay 
in Loudermill's case constitutes an additional constitutional 
claim, even after he is compensated for the violation of his 
right to a pretermination hearing under the holding of parts I-
IV? If this latter question is indeed the one you intend to 
answer, I wonder if you would consider recasting the current 
language so as to allay my confusion? 
I should perhaps just briefly expand on my difficulty. It 
would seem to me that the injury stemming from the lack of some 
pretermination hearing arguably runs, at most, from the date of 
termination until the time Loudermill actually received a 
hearing, some 11 weeks after he filed his appeal. {In fact, this 
limitation on the scope of the injury might be worth stating 
explicitly.) That injury presumably will be compensated on 
remand in light of parts I-IV. It is possible to imagine, 
however, that Loudermill may also contend that even if such 
compensation is forthcoming, he was still constitutionally 
injured by the additional delay after his hearing until written 
notice of a final decision was issued. {As I note below, I am 
not sure that Loudermill has actually made such a claim.) In 
this case, that additional period is claimed to be approximately 
seven months, although I note that the Commission actually 
announced its decision orally on July 20, 1981, less than six 
months after the initial hearing. If, as I suspect, it is this 
second possible claim that you are attempting to head off in part 
V, rather than some claim premised as was Loudermill's initial 
complaint on an uncompensated failure to provide a pretermination 
hearing, I wonder if the opinion should so state? 
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Next, I wonder if we need address this second, theoretically 
distinct claim at all? My Conference notes indicate that no one 
expressed any position on this issue. Indeed, it was my sense 
that we would not have to reach the issue, once we found that 
Loudermill's rights were violated by the lack of pretermination 
procedures. I am not at all certain that Loudermill's complaint 
must be read to state the delay issue as a "separate claim 
altogether," as you suggest on page 13 n.11. The complaint 
itself is not divided into separate counts or claims and, as 
written, I think it can fairly be read to state the issues in the 
alternative -- that is, if the lack of pretermination procedures 
were found constitutional, then the delay before hearing would be 
unconstitutional. Because we find to the contrary regarding the 
premise of this proposition, the alternative question as pleaded 
really need not be reached. 
In this regard, it is also significant that Loudermill's 
complaint alleges only that the Ohio statute "is unconstitutional 
as applied ••• because classified civil service employees are not 
given sufficiently prompt post-removal or post-suspension 
hearings." JA 11 (emphasis supplied). Thus the additional issue 
of delay preceeding the Commission's final decision was not even 
fairly raised by Loudermill's complaint. Finally, while you are 
of course correct that the delay issue was raised in Loudermill's 
cross-petition for certiorari which we granted, I agree with your 
notation in your draft dissent from denial last Term that the 
cross-petition should be granted merely "so that the entire case 
could be reviewed." As you also pointed out then, the only 
substantive inter-Circuit conflict requiring our review is "under 
what circumstances a pre-termination hearing is required." 
Because we did not focus on the subsidiary question of post-
termination delay either at oral argument or at Conference, would 
it not be best not to address it, especially when there is no 
unavoidable need to do so in this case? 
Finally, if you decide that the second issue must be reached 
despite Loudermill's failure to plead it, I wonder if you would 
consider specifying in some greater detail the reasons for 
finding that his allegations present no constitutional claim? As 
you note on page 13, the post-hearing procedures afforded 
Loudermill were quite thorough; some explication might be in 
order. For example, for the first month, the hearing officer, 
whose decision Loudermill cites with pleasure, was busy writing 
his decision. Then, presumably, the parties compiled and filed 
their objections and legal memoranda supporting their positions. 
Then the full Commission held another hearing. Immediately after 
that hearing, the Commission orally announced its decision --
thus Loudermill knew the final outcome in his case at that time, 
although it took the Commission another five weeks to issue its 
written decision. 
Furthermore, and significantly in my mind, as far as this 
record shows Loudermill never raised an objection to this alleged 
"delay" while it was ongoing, nor did he or does he now contend 
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that the procedures were unfairly complicated, intentionally 
lengthy, or to his disadvantage. A party cannot await what he 
thinks will be a favorable outcome silently and patiently, and 
then complain of delay when he discovers the decision is not to 
his liking. Moreover, Loudermill alleges no bad faith on the 
part of the Commission, nor does he allege that there exists some 
pattern of overly long delay in the Ohio Commission's disposition 
of like claims. Absent more specific allegations along these 
lines, I am disposed to agree with you that the bare allegation 
that Loudermill had •too long a wait• fails to state a 
constitutional claim in these circumstances. 
I might finally add that your citation to Matthews and 
Arnett in support of the conclusion in part V strikes me as 
incomplete without at least a •cf.• to Barchi (in which we 
disapproved a statutory requirement for a "prompt• hearing with 
no more than a 30-day _delay before final decision). At bottom, 
as is usually the case when considering due process issues, 
claims regarding post-deprivation procedural delay can be 
resolved only after detailed review of the facts of each case. 
In light of this reality, perhaps no citations at all would be 
preferable? 
In sum, I think that the issue addressed in part V really 
need not be reached. But if part Vis to remain, I hope you 
might consider stating the issue more clearly for me and adding a 
bit more detail to its resolution, so that I may join your 
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Re: 83-1362 - Cleveland Board of Education 
v. Loudermillal 
83-1363 - Parma Board of Education v. 
Donnelly 
Dear Byron: 
If you can make two rather minor changes, I will 
join you. 
First, can you omit the citation to the majority 
opinion in Bishop v. Wood on page 7? That opinion 
did not endorse the "bitter with the sweet" theory, 
and I cannot join a Court opinion that implies that 
it did. I, of course, have no objection to your 
citation of your dissent in Bishop. 
Second, should you not note that there are some 
situations in which a post-deprivation hearing will 
satisfy due process reqirements? E.g. North American 
Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 
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January 24✓ 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 
Dear Bill, 
In response to your letter of January 3, I much prefer to 
retain Part V. It is clear enough to me that Loudermill pleaded 
and continues to insist that he was entitled not only to a pre-
termination opportunity to respond but also to a reasonably 
prompt full hearing after termination. Nor do I have any doubt 
that it is advisable to address both questions. 
As for the content of Part v, the chronology you recount is 
contained earlier in the draft. I have added, however, your 
point that Loudermill never complained about undue delay during 
the hearing and decision process. Also, as you suggest, I have 
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SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 83-1362, 83-1363 AND 83-6392 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER 
83-1362 V. 
JAMES LOUDERMILL ET AL. 
PARMA BOARD OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER 
83-1363 v. 
RICHARD DONNELLY ET AL. 
JAMES LOUDERMILL, PETITIONER 
83-6392 v. 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In these cases we consider what pretermination process 
must be accorded a public employee who can be discharged 
only for cause. 
I 
In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education, petitioner in 
No. 83-1362, hired respondent James Loudermill as a secu-
rity guard. On his job application, Loudermill stated that he 
had never been convicted of a felony. Eleven months later, 
as part of a routine examination of his employment records, 
the Board discovered that in fact Loudermill had been con-
victed of grand larceny in 1968. By letter dated November 
3, 1980, the Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill 
that he had been dismissed because of his dishonesty in filling 
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forded an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty 
or to challenge his dismissal. On November 13, the Board 
adopted a resolution officially approving the discharge. 
Under Ohio law, Loudermill was a "classified civil serv-
ant." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.11 (1984). Such employ-
ees can be terminated only for cause, and may obtain admin-
istrative review if discharged. § 124.34 (1984). Pursuant to 
this provision, Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland 
Civil Service Commission on November 12. The Commis-
sion appointed a referee, who held a hearing on January 29, 
1981. Loudermill argued that he had thought that his 1968 
larceny conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than a fel-
ony. The referee recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 
1981, the full Commission heard argument and orally an-
nounced that it would uphold the dismissal. Proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law followed on August 10, and 
Loud~rmill's attorneys were advised of the result by mail on 
August 21. 
Although the Commission's decision was subject to judicial 
review in the state courts, Loudermill instead brought the 
present suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that § 124.34 was un-
constitutional on its face because it did not provide the em-
ployee an opportunity to respond to the charges against him 
prior to removal. As a result, discharged employees were 
deprived of liberty and property without due process. The 
complaint also alleged that the provision was unconstitutional 
as applied because discharged employees were not given suf-
ficiently prompt post-removal hearings. 
Before a responsive pleading was filed , the District Court 
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). It held that 
because the very statute that created the property right in 
continued employment also specified the procedures for dis-
charge, and because those procedures were followed, Loud-
- -
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ermill was, by definition, afforded all the process due. The 
post-termination hearing also adequately protected Louder-
mill's liberty interests. Finally, the District Court con-
cluded that in light of the Commission's crowded docket, the 
delay in processing Loudermill's administrative appeal was 
constitutionally acceptable. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 
83-1362, pp. A36-A42. 
The other case before us arises on similar facts and fol-
lowed a similar course. Respondent Richard Donnelly was a 
bus mechanic for the Parma Board of Education. In August 
1977, Donnelly was fired because he had failed an eye exami-
nation. He was offered a chance to retake the exam but did 
not do so. Like Loudermill, Donnelly appealed to the Civil 
Service Commission. After a year of wrangling about the 
timeliness of his appeal, the Commission heard the case. It 
ordered Donnelly reinstated, though without backpay.' In 
a complaint essentially identical to Loudermill's, Donnelly 
challenged the constitutionality of the dismissal procedures. 
The District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, rely-
ing on its opinion in Loudermill. 
The District Court denied a joint motion to alter or amend 
its judgment, 2 and the cases were consolidated for appeal. 
'The statute authorizes the Commission to "affirm, disaffirm, or modify 
the judgment of the appointing authority." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124. 34 
(1984). Petitioner interprets this as authority to reinstate with or without 
back pay and views the Commission's decision as a compromise. Brief for 
Petitioner in No. 83-1363, p. 6, n. 3; Tr. of Oral. Arg. 14. The Court of 
Appeals, however, stated that the Commission lacked the power to award 
back pay. 721 F . 2d 550, 554, n. 3 (1983). As the decision of the Commis-
sion is not in the record, we are unable to determine the reasoning behind 
it. 
2 In denying the motion, the District Court no longer relied on the prin-
ciple that the state legislature could define the necessary procedures in the 
course of creating the property right. Instead, it reached the same result 
under a balancing test based on JUSTICE POWELL's concurring opinion in 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168-169 (1974), and the Court's opinion 
in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U. S. 319 (1976). App. to Pet. for Cert. in 
No. 83-1362, pp. A54-A57. 
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A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reversed in part and remanded. 721 F. 2d 550 (1983). 
After rejecting arguments that the actions were barred by 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and by res 
judicata-arguments that are not renewed here-the Court 
of Appeals found that both respondents had been deprived of 
due process. It disagreed with the District Court's original 
rationale. Instead, it concluded that the compelling private 
interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of 
presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added 
administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. Id., at 
561-562. With regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty, 
and Loudermill's 9-month wait for an administrative decision, 
the court affirmed the District Court, finding no constitu-
tional violation. Id., at 563-564. 
The dissenting Judge argued that respondents' property 
interests were conditioned by the procedural limitations ac-
companying the grant thereof. He considered constitutional 
requirements satisfied because there was a reliable 
pretermination finding of "cause," coupled with a due process 
hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
Id. , at 566. 
Both employers petitioned for certiorari. Nos. 83-1362 
and 83-1363. In a cross-petition, Loudermill sought review 
of the rulings adverse to him. No. 83-6392. We granted all 
three petitions, 467 U. S. -- (1984), and now affirm in all 
respects. 
II 
Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their 
having had a property right in continued employment. 3 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972); 
3 Of course, the Due Process Clause also protects interests of life and 
liberty. The Court of Appeals' finding of a constitutional violation was 
based solely on the deprivation of a property interest. We address below 
Loudermill's contention that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of lib-
erty. Seen. 12, infra. 
- -
83-1362, 83-1363 & 83-6392--OPINION 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LOUDERMILL 5 
Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425 (1901). If they 
did, the State could not deprive them of this property with-
out due process. See Memphis Li,ght, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 
565, 573-574 (1975). 
Property interests are not created by the Constitution, 
"they are created and their dimensions are defined by exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law .... " Board of Regents v. Roth, 
supra, at 577. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 709 
(1976). The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. 
Respondents were "classified civil service employees," Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 124.11 (1984), entitled to retain their posi-
tions "during good behavior and efficient service," who could 
not be dismissed "except . . . for . . . misfeasance, malfea-
sance, or nonfeasance in office," § 124.34. 4 The statute 
plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both lower 
courts, that respondents possessed property rights in contin-
ued employment. Indeed, this question does not seem to 
have been disputed below. 5 
' The relevant portion of§ 124.34 provides that no classified civil serv-
ant may be removed except "for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, 
drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of 
the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the 
director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure 
of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfea-
sance in office." 
• The Cleveland Board of Education now asserts that Loudermill had no 
property right under state law because he obtained his employment by 
lying on the application. It argues that had Loudermill answered truth-
fully he would not have been hired. He therefore lacked a "legitimate 
claim of entitlement" to the position. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1362, 
pp. 14-15. 
For several reasons, we must reject this submission. First, it was not 
raised below. Second, it makes factual assumptions-that Loudermill 
lied, and that he would not have been hired had he not done so-that are 
inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint and inappropriate at this 
stage of the litigation, which has not proceeded past the initial pleadings 
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The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right 
is defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of 
procedures for its deprivation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 
83-1363, pp. 26-27. The Board stresses that in addition to 
specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out 
procedures by which termination may take place. 6 The pro-
cedures were adhered to in these cases. According to peti-
tioner, "[t]o require additional procedures would in effect ex-
pand the scope of the property interest itself." Id., at 27. 
See also Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5-10. 
This argument, which was accepted by the District Court, 
has its genesis in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. S. 134 (1974). Arnett involved a challenge by a for-
mer federal employee to the procedures by which he was dis-
missed. The plurality reasoned that where the legislation 
conferring the substantive right also sets out the procedural 
mechanism for enforcing that right, the two cannot be 
separated: 
"The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guar-
antee against removal without cause in the abstract, but 
such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which 
Congress has designated for the determination of cause. 
stage. Finally, the argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent 
with the undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired and did hold the secu-
rity guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional obligations by 
rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why Loudermill should not 
have been hired in the first place. 
6 After providing for dismissal only for cause, see n. 4, supra, § 124.34 
states that the dismissed employee is to be provided with a copy of the 
order ofremoval giving the reasons therefor. Within ten days of the filing 
of the order with the director of administrative services, the employee may 
file a written appeal with the state personnel board of review or the Com-
m1ss1on. "In the event such an appeal is filed , the board or commission 
shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a 
trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing 
with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffirrn, or modify the 
judgment of the appointing authority." Either side may obtain review of 
the Commission's decision in the state court of common pleas. 
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" ... [W]here the grant of a substantive right is inex-
tricably intertwined with the limitations on the proce-
dures which are to be employed in determining that 
right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the 
bitter with the sweet." Id., at 152-154. 
This view garnered three votes in Arnett, but was specifi-
cally rejected by the other six Justices. See id., at 166-167 
(POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.,); id., at 177-178, 185 
(WHITE, J.,); id., at 211 (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas 
and BRENNAN, JJ.). Since then, this theory has at times 
seemed to gather some additional support. See Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 355-361 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 586-587 (POWELL, J., joined by 
BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., dis-
senting). More recently, however, the Court has clearly re-
jected it. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491 (1980), we 
pointed out that "minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a 
matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact 
that the State may have specified its own procedures that it 
may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to ad-
verse official action." This conclusion was reiterated in Lo-
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982), 
where we reversed the lower court's holding that because the 
entitlement arose from a state statute, the legislature had 
the prerogative to define the procedures to be followed to 
protect that entitlement. 
In light of these holdings, it is settled that the "bitter with 
the sweet" approach misconceives the constitutional guar-
antee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. 
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause pro-
vides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and prop-
erty-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally 
adequate procedures. The categories of substance and pro-
cedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause 
would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot 
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be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any 
more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is 
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional 
guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a 
property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitu-
tionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once 
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." 
Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167 (POWELL, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in result in part); see id., at 185 (WHITE, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause 
applies, "the question remains what process is due." Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The answer to 
that question is not to be found in the Ohio statute. 
III 
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 
306, 313 (1950). We have described "the root requirement" 
of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be 
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of 
any significant property interest." 7 Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542 (1971). This principle requires 
"some kind of a hearing" prior to the discharge of an em-
ployee who has a constitutionally protected property interest 
in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 
569-570; Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593, 599 (1972). As 
we pointed out last Term, this rule has been settled for some 
time now. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. --, --, n. 10 
7 There are, of course, some situations in which a post-deprivation hear-
ing will satisfy due process requirements. See Ewing v. Mytinger & 
Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); North American Cold Storage Co. 
v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908). 
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(1984); id., at-- (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Even decisions finding no constitutional vi-
olation in termination procedures have relied on the existence 
of some pretermination opportunity to respond. For exam-
ple, in Arnett six Justices found constitutional minima satis-
fied where the employee had access to the material upon 
which the charge was based and could respond orally and in 
writing and present rebuttal affidavits. See also Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 65 (1979) (no due process violation 
where horse trainer whose license was suspended "was given 
more than one opportunity to present his side of the story"). 
The need for some form of pretermination hearing, recog-
nized in these cases, is evident from a balancing of the com-
peting interests at stake. These are the private interest in 
retaining employment, the governmental interest in the ex-
peditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoid-
ance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous 
termination. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 
(1976). 
First, the significance of the private interest in retaining 
employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recog-
nized the severity of depriving a person of the means of liveli-
hood. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975); 
Bell v. Burson, supra, at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 
254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 
U. S. 337, 340 (1969). While a fired worker may find em-
ployment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is 
likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances 
under which he left his previous job. See Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 83-84 (1973). 
Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his 
side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an 
accurate decision. Dismissals for cause will of ten involve 
factual disputes. Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 
686 (1979). Even where the facts are clear, the appropriate-
ness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, 
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the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of 
the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes 
effect. See Goss v. L<Ypez, 419 U. S., at 583-584; Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 784-786 (1973). 8 
The cases before us illustrate these considerations. Both 
respondents had plausible arguments to make that might 
have prevented their discharge. The fact that the Commis-
sion saw fit to reinstate Donnelly suggests that an error 
might have been avoided had he been provided an opportu-
nity to make his case to the Board. As for Loudermill, given 
the Commission's ruling we cannot say that the discharge 
was mistaken. Nonetheless, in light of the referree's recom-
mendation, neither can we say that a fully informed 
decisionmaker might not have exercised its discretion and 
decided not to dismiss him, notwithstanding its authority to 
do so. In any event, the termination involved arguable is-
sues, 9 and the right to a hearing does not depend on a dem-
8 This is not to say that where state conduct is entirely discretionary the 
Due Process Clause is brought into play. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U. S. 215, 228 (1976). Nor is it to say that a person can insist on a hearing 
in order to argue that the decisionmaker should be lenient and depart from 
legal requirements. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 114 (1977). The 
point is that where there is an entitlement, a prior hearing facilitates the 
consideration of whether a permissible course of action is also an appropri-
ate one. This is one way in which providing "effective notice and informal 
hearing permitting the [employee] to give his version of the events will 
provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action. At least the [em-
ployer] will be alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
ments about cause and effect. . . . [H]is discretion will be more in-
formed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced." Goss v. 
Lapez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975). 
• Loudermill's dismissal turned not on the objective fact that he was an 
ex-felon or the inaccuracy of his statement to the contrary, but on the sub-
jective question whether he had lied on his application form. His explana-
tion for the false statement is plausible in light of the fact that he received 
only a suspended 6-month sentence and a fine on the grand larceny convic-
tion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. 
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onstration of certain success. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 
247, 266 (1978). 
The governmental interest in immediate termination does 
not outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording 
the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination 
would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor 
intolerable delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the 
employee's interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous 
decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employer would 
continue to receive the benefit of the employee's labors. It 
is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a 
new one. A governmental employer also has an interest in 
keeping citizens usefully employed rather than taking the 
possibly erroneous and counter-productive step of forcing its 
employees onto the welfare rolls. Finally, in those situa-
tions where the employer perceives a significant hazard in 
keeping the employee on the job, 10 it can avoid the problem 
by suspending with pay. 
IV 
The foregoing considerations indicate that the pretermina-
tion "hearing," though necessary, need not be elaborate. 
We have pointed out that "[t]he formality and procedural 
requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the im-
portance of the interests involved and the nature of the sub-
sequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. , at 
10 In the cases before us, no such danger seems to have existed. The 
exam Donnelly failed was related to driving school buses, not repairing 
them. Id. , 39-40. As the Court of Appeals stated, "[n]o emergency was 
even conceivable with respect to Donnelly. " 721 F. 2d, at 562. As for 
Loudermill, petitioner states that "to find that we have a person who is an 
ex-felon as our security guard is very distressful to us." Tr. of Oral Arg. 
19. But the termination was based on the presumed misrepresentation on 
the employment form, not on the felony conviction. In fact, Ohio law pro-
vides that an employee "shall not be disciplined for acts," including criminal 
convictions, occuring more than two years previously. See Ohio Admin. 
Code § 124-3-04 (1979). Petitioner concedes that Loudermill's job per-
formance was fully satisfactory. 
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378. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 
894-895 (1961). In general, "something less" than a full evi-
dentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative 
action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 343. Under 
state law, respondents were later entitled to a full 
administrative hearing and judicial review. The only ques-
tion is what steps were required before the termination took 
effect. 
In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), 
has the Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing 
prior to adverse governmental action. However, as the 
Goldberg Court itself pointed out, see id., at 264, that case 
presented significantly different considerations than are 
present in the context of public employment. Here, the 
pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the pro-
priety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against 
mistaken decisions-essentially, a determination of whether 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges 
against the employee are true and support the proposed ac-
tion. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 540. 
The essential requirements of due process, and all that re-
spondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice 
and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present 
reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action 
should not be taken is a fundamental due process require-
ment. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). The tenured public employee is enti-
tled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U. S., at 170-171 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at 195-196 
(opinion of WHITE, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 
581. To require more than this prior to termination would 
intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's inter-
est in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 
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V 
Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a 
full post-termination hearing. In his cross-petition Louder-
mill asserts, as a separate constitutional violation, that his 
administrative proceedings took too long. 11 The Court of 
Appeals held otherwise, and we agree. 12 The Due Process 
Clause requires provision of a hearing "at a meaningful 
time." E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 
(1965). At some point, a delay in the post-termination hear-
ing would become a constitutional violation. See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S., at 66. In the present case, however, the 
delay stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the proce-
dures. Moreover, Loudermill at the time did not complain of \ 
undue delay or assert any unfairness in the hearing and deci-
sionmaking process. The chronology of the proceedings set 
out in Loudermill's complaint, coupled with the assertion that 
11 Loudermill's hearing before the referee occurred two and one-half 
months after he filed his appeal. The Commission issued its written deci-
sion six and one-half months after that. Administrative proceedings in 
Donnelly's case, once it was determined that they could proceed at all, 
were swifter. A writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to hold a 
hearing was issued on May 9, 1978; the hearing took place on May 30; the 
order of reinstatement was issued on July 6. 
Section 124.34 provides that a hearing is to be held within 30 days of the 
appeal, though the Ohio courts have ruled that the time limit is not manda-
tory. E.g., In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc. 13, 17, 372 N. E. 2d 1345, 1347 
(1977). The statute does not provide a time limit for the actual decision. 
12 It might be argued that once we find a due process violation in the 
denial of a pretermination hearing we need not and should not consider 
whether the post-termination procedures were adequate. See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 72-174 (1979) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). We 
conclude that it is appropriate to consider this issue, however, for three 
reasons. First, the allegation of a distinct due process violation in the 
administrative delay is not an alternative theory supporting the same re-
lief, but a separate claim altogether. Second, it was decided by the court 
below and is raised in the cross-petition. Finally, the existence of post-
termination procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of 
pretermination procedures. 
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nine months is too long to wait, does not state a claim of a l 
constitutional deprivation. 13 
VI 
We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by 
a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-
termination administrative procedures as provided by the 
Ohio statute. Because respondents allege in their com-
plaints that they had no chance to respond, the District Court 
erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
13 The cross-petition also argues that Loudermill was unconstitutionally 
deprived of liberty because of the accusation of dishonesty that hung over 
his head during the administrative proceedings. As the Court of Appeals 
found, 721 F. 2d, at 563, n. 18, the failure to allege that the reasons for the 
dismissal were published dooms this claim. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 
u. s. 341, 348 (1976). 
~ 
